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1Abstract
In the current debates on the future European order, the European Union (EU) is often described 
as an ‘emerging federation’. The article claims that federalism is not only useful in deliberating 
about the future of the EU, but also a good tool for understanding the current structure and 
functioning of the European system of multi-level governance. Non-state centric conceptions 
of federalism provide a better understanding of the current structure and functioning of the 
European system of multilevel governance than most theories of European integration and 
International Relations do. We combine political and economic perspectives of federalism 
to analyze the ‘balancing act’ between effective political representation and efficient policy-
making in the EU. Drawing on the examples of Germany and Switzerland in particular, we 
argue that the increasing delegation of powers to the central EU level needs to be paralleled by 
either strengthened patterns of fiscal federalism or an empowered representation of functional 
interests at the European level. Without such ‘re-balancing’, the current legitimacy problems 
of the EU are likely to intensify.
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